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In this paper a number of problems are considered which are related to the modelling of eye guidance
under visual attention in a natural setting. From a crude discussion of a variety of available models spelled
in probabilistic terms, it appears that current approaches in computational vision are hitherto far from
achieving the goal of an active observer relying upon eye guidance to accomplish real-world tasks. We argue
that this challenging goal not only requires to embody, in a principled way, the problem of eye guidance
within the action/perception loop, but to face the inextricable link tying up visual attention, emotion and
executive control, in so far as recent neurobiological findings are weighed up.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As the french philosopher Merleau-Ponty put it, “vision is a gaze at grips with a visible
world” [Merleau–Ponty 1945]. Goals and purposes, either internal or external, press the
observer to maximise his information intake over time, by moment-to-moment sampling the
most informative parts of the world. In natural vision this endless endeavour is accomplished
through a sequence of eye movements such as saccades and smooth pursuit, followed by
fixations. Gaze shifts require visual attention to precede them to their goal, which has been
shown to enhance the perception of selected part of the visual field (in turn related to the
foveal structure of the human eye, see Kowler 2011 for an extensive discussion of these
aspects).
The computational counterpart of using gaze shifts to enable a perceptual-motor analysis
of the observed world can be traced back to pioneering work on active or animate vision
[Aloimonos et al. 1988; Ballard 1991; Bajcsy and Campos 1992]. The main concern at
the time was to embody vision in the action-perception loop of an artificial agent that
purposively acts upon the environment, an idea that grounds its roots in early cybernetics
[Cordeschi 2002]. To such aim the sensory apparatus of the organism must be active and
flexible, for instance, the vision system can manipulate the viewpoint of the camera(s)
in order to investigate the environment and get better information from it. Surprisingly
enough, the link between attention and active vision, notably when instantiated via gaze
shifts (e.g, a moving camera), was overlooked in those early approaches, as lucidly remarked
by Rothenstein and Tsotsos [2008]. Indeed, active vision, as it has been proposed and used
in computer vision, must include attention as a sub-problem [Rothenstein and Tsotsos
2008]. First and foremost when it must confront the computational load to achieve real-
time processing (e.g., for autonomous robotics and videosurveillance).
Nevertheless, the mainstream of computer vision has not dedicated to attentive processes
and, more generally, to active perception much consideration. This is probably due to the
original sin of conceiving vision as a pure information-processing task, a reconstruction
process creating representations at increasingly levels of abstraction, a land where action
had no place: the “from pixels to predicates” paradigm [Aloimonos et al. 1988].
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To make a long story short, the research field had a sudden burst when the paper by Itti
et al. [1998] was published. Their work provided a sound and neat computational model
(and the software simulation) to contend with the problem: in a nutshell, derive a saliency
map and generate gaze shifts as the result of a Winner-Take-All (WTA) sequential selection
of most salient locations. Since then, proposals and techniques have flourished. Under these
circumstances, a deceptively simple question arises: Where are we now?
A straight answer, which is the leitmotiv of this paper, is that whilst early active vi-
sion approaches overlooked attention, current approaches have betrayed purposive active
perception.
In this perspective, here we provide a critical discussion of a number of models and
techniques. It will be by no means exhaustive, and yet, to some extent, idiosyncratic. Our
purpose is not to offer a review (there are excellent ones the reader is urged to consult, e.g.,
[Borji and Itti 2013; Borji et al. 2014; Bruce et al. 2015; Bylinskii et al. 2015]), but rather
to spell in a probabilistic framework the variety of approaches, so to discuss in a principled
way current limitations and to envisage intriguing directions of research, e.g., the hitherto
neglected link between oculomotor behavior and emotion.
In the following Section we highlight critical points of current approaches and open issues.
In Section 3 we frame such problems in the language of probability. Section 4 discusses pos-
sible routes to reconsider the problem of oculomotor behaviour within the action/perception
loop. In Section 5 we explore the terra incognita of gaze shifts and emotion.
2. A MINI REVIEW AND OPEN ISSUES
The aim of a computational model of attentive eye guidance is to answer the question Where
to Look Next? by providing:
(1) at the computational theory level (following Marr 1982), an account of the mapping
from visual data of a natural scene, say I (raw image data representing either a
static picture or a stream of images), to a sequence of time-stamped gaze locations
(rF1 , t1), (rF2 , t2), · · ·, namely
I 7→ {rF1 , t1; rF2 , t2; · · ·}, (1)
(2) at the algorithmic level, a procedure that simulates such mapping.
A simple example of the problem we are facing is shown in Figure 1.
Under this conceptualization, when the input I is a static scene (a picture), the fixation
duration time and saccade (lengths and directions) sequence are the only observables of
the underlying guidance mechanism. When I stands for a time varying scene (e.g. a video),
pursuit needs to be taken into account, too. We will adopt the generic terms of gaze shifts
for either pursuit, saccades and fixational movements.
In the following, for notational simplicity, we will write the time series {rF1 , t1; rF2 , t2; · · ·}
as the sequence {rF (1), rF (2), · · ·}, unless the expanded form is needed. Also, we will generi-
cally refer to such sequence as scan path, though this term has a historically precise meaning
in the eye movement literature [Privitera 2006].
The common practice of computational approaches to derive the mapping (1) is to con-
ceive it as a two step procedure:
(1) obtaining a suitable perceptual representation W, i.e., I 7→ W;
(2) using W to generate the scan path, W 7→ {rF (1), rF (2), · · ·}.
It is important to remark that each gaze position rF (t) sets a new field of view for perceiving
the world, thus W = {WrF (1),WrF (2), · · ·} should be a time-varying representation, even in
the case of a static image input. This feedback effect of the moving gaze is hardly considered
at the modelling stage [Zelinsky 2008; Tatler et al. 2011].
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Fig. 1. Scan paths eye tracked from different human observers while viewing three pictures of different
information content: outdoor (top row), indoor with meaningful objects (middle row), indoor with high
semantic content (person and face, bottom row). The area of yellow disks marking fixations between saccades
is proportional to fixation time (images freely available from the Fixations in FAces dataset).
By overviewing the field [Tatler et al. 2011; Borji and Itti 2013; Bruce et al. 2015; Bylinskii
et al. 2015], computational modelling has been mainly concerned with the first step: deriving
a representation W, typically in the form of a salience map. Yet, such step has recently
evolved in a parallel research program, in which gaze shift prediction and simulation is not
the focus, but salient object detection (for an in-depth review of this “second wave” of
saliency-centered methods, see Borji et al. 2014).
The second step, that is W 7→ {rF (1), rF (2), · · ·}, which actually brings in the question
of how we look rather than where, is seldom taken into account. Surprisingly, in spite of
the fact that the most cited work in the field [Itti et al. 1998] clearly addressed the how
issue (gaze shifts as the result of a WTA sequential selection of most salient locations),
most models simply overlook the problem. As a matter of fact, the representation W, once
computed, is usually validated in respect of its capacity for predicting the image regions that
would be explored by the overt attentional shifts of human observers (in a task designed
to minimize the role of top-down factors). Predictability is assessed according to some
established evaluation measures (see Borji and Itti 2013, and Ku¨mmerer et al. 2015, for a
recent discussion).
In other cases, if needed for practical purposes, e.g. for robotic applications, the problem of
oculomotor action selection is solved by adopting some simple deterministic choice procedure
that usually relies on selecting the gaze position r as the argument that maximizes a measure
on the given representation W.
We will attack on the problem related to gaze shift generation in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. In
the following Section we first discuss representational problems.
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2.1. Levels of representation and control
The guidance of eye movements is likely to be influenced by a hierarchy of several interacting
control loops, operating at different levels of processing. Each processing step exploits the
most suitable representation of the viewed scene for its own level of abstraction. Schu¨tz
et al. [2011], in a plausible portrayal, have sorted out the following representational levels:
1) salience, 2) objects, 3) values, and 4) plans.
Up to this date, the majority of computational models have retained a central place for
low-level visual conspicuity [Tatler et al. 2011; Borji and Itti 2013; Bruce et al. 2015]. The
perceptual representation of the world W is usually epitomized in the form of a spatial
saliency map, which is mostly derived bottom-up (early salience) following [Itti et al. 1998].
The weakness of the bottom-up approach has been largely discussed (see, e.g. Tatler
et al. 2011; Foulsham and Underwood 2008; Einha¨user et al. 2008). Indeed, the effect of early
salience on attention is likely to be a correlational effect rather than an causal one [Foulsham
and Underwood 2008], [Schu¨tz et al. 2011]. Few examples are provided in Fig. 2, where,
as opposed to human scan paths (in free-viewing conditions), the scan path generated by
using a salience-based representation [Itti et al. 1998] does not spot semantically important
objects (faces), the latter not being detected as regions of high contrast in colour, texture
and luminance with respect to other regions of the picture.
Under these circumstances, early saliency can be modulated to improve its fixation pre-
diction. Torralba [2003] has considered prior knowledge on the typical spatial location of
the search target, as well as contextual information (the gist of a scene, Rensink 2000).
Further, object knowledge can be used to top-down tune early salience. In particular, when
dealing with faces, a face detection step [Cerf et al. 2008], [deCroon et al. 2011], [Marat
et al. 2013] or a prior for Bayesian integration with low level features [Boccignone et al.
2008], can provide a reliable cue to complement early conspicuity maps. Indeed, faces drive
attention in a direct fashion [Cerf et al. 2009] and the same holds for text regions [Cerf et al.
2008; Clavelli et al. 2014]. It has been argued that salience has only an indirect effect on
attention by acting through recognised objects: observers attend to interesting objects and
salience contributes little extra information to fixation prediction [Einha¨user et al. 2008].
As a matter of fact, in the real world, most fixations are on task-relevant objects and this
may or may not correlate with the saliency of regions of the visual array [Canosa 2009;
Rothkopf et al. 2007]. Notwithstanding, object-based information has been scarcely taken
into account in computational models [Tatler et al. 2011]. There are of course exceptions to
this state of affairs, most notable ones those provided by Rao et al. [2002], Sun et al. [2008],
the Bayesian models discussed by Chikkerur et al. [2010] and Borji et al. [2012].
The representational problem is just the light side of the eye guidance problem. When
actual eye tracking data are considered, one has to confront with the dark side: regardless
of the perceptual input, scan paths exhibit both systematic tendencies and notable inter-
and intra-subject variability. As Canosa [2009] put it, where we choose to look next at any
given moment in time is not completely deterministic, but neither is it completely random.
2.2. Biases in oculomotor behaviour
Systematic tendencies or “biases” in oculomotor behaviour can be thought of as regularities
that are common across all instances of, and manipulations to, behavioural tasks [Tatler and
Vincent 2008; 2009]. In that case case useful information about how the observers will move
their eyes can be found. One remarkable example is the amplitude distribution of saccades
and microsaccades that typically exhibit a positively skewed, long-tailed shape [Tatler et al.
2011; Dorr et al. 2010; Tatler and Vincent 2008; 2009]. Other paradigmatic examples of
systematic tendencies in scene viewing are: initiating saccades in the horizontal and vertical
directions more frequently than in oblique directions; small amplitude saccades tending to
be followed by long amplitude ones and vice versa [Tatler and Vincent 2008; 2009].
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Indeed, biases affecting the manner in which we explore scenes with our eyes are well
known in the psychological literature (see Le Meur and Coutrot 2016 for a thorough review),
albeit underexploited in computational models. Such biases may arise from a number of
sources. Tatler and Vincent [2009] have suggested the following: biomechanical factors,
saccade flight time and landing accuracy, uncertainty, distribution of objects of interest in
the environment, task parameters.
Understanding biases in eye guidance can provide powerful new insights into the decision
about where to look in complex scenes. In a remarkable study, Tatler and Vincent [2009]
provided striking evidence that a model based solely on these biases and therefore blind to
current visual information can outperform salience-based approaches. Further, the predic-
tive performance of a salience-based model can be improved from 56% to 80% by including
the probability of gaze shift directions and amplitudes.
Failing to account properly for such characteristics results in scan patterns that are fairly
different from those generated by human observers (which can be easily noticed in the
example provided in Fig. 2) and eventually in distributions of saccade amplitudes and
orientations that do not match those estimated from human eye behaviour.
2.3. Variability
When looking at natural images or movies [Dorr et al. 2010] under a free-viewing or a
general-purpose task, the relocation of gaze can be different among observers even though
the same locations are taken into account. In practice, there is a small probability that
two observers will fixate exactly the same location at exactly the same time. This effect
is even more remarkable when free-viewing static images: consistency in fixation locations
selected by observers decreases over the course of the first few fixations after stimulus onset
[Tatler et al. 2011] and can become idiosyncratic. Such variations in individual scan paths
(as regards chosen fixations, spatial scanning order, and fixation duration) still hold when
the scene contains semantically rich ”objects” (e.g., faces, see Figures 1 and 2). Variability
is also exhibited by the same subject along different trials on equal stimuli.
Randomness in motor responses is likely to be originated from endogenous stochastic
variations that affect each stage between a sensory event and the motor response: sensing,
information processing, movement planning and executing [van Beers 2007]. It is worth
noting that uncertainty comes into play since the earliest stage of visual processing: the
human retina evolved such that high quality vision is restricted to the small part of the
retina (about 20 − 50 degrees of visual angle) aligned with the visual axis, the fovea at the
centre of vision. Thus, for many visually-guided behaviours the coarse information from pe-
ripheral vision is insufficient [Strasburger et al. 2011]. In certain circumstances, uncertainty
may promote almost “blind” visual exploration strategies [Tatler and Vincent 2009; Over
et al. 2007], much like the behaviour of a foraging animal exploring the environment under
incomplete information; indeed when animals have limited information about where targets
(e.g., resource patches) are located, different random search strategies may provide different
chances to find them Bartumeus and Catalan 2009.
Indeed, few works have been trying to cope with the variability issue, after the early work
by Ellis and Stark [1986], Hacisalihzade et al. [1992]. The glorious WTA scheme [Itti et al.
1998], or variants such as the selection of the proto-object with the highest attentional weight
[Wischnewski et al. 2010] are deterministic procedures. Even when probabilistic frameworks
are used to infer where to look next, the final decision is often taken via the maximum a
posteriori (MAP) criterion which again is a deterministic procedure (technically, an arg max
operation, see Elazary and Itti 2010; Boccignone et al. 2008; Najemnik and Geisler 2005;
Chernyak and Stark 2001), or variants like the robust mean (arithmetic mean with maximum
value) over candidate positions [Begum et al. 2010]. As a result, for a chosen visual input
I the mapping W 7→ {rF (1), rF (2), · · ·} will always generate the same scan path across
different trials.
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Fig. 2. A worst case analysis of scan path generation based on early salience (top left image, via Itti et al.
1998) vs. scan paths eye tracked from human subjects. Despite of inter-subject variability concerning the
gaze relocation pattern and fixation duration time, human observers consistently fixate on the two faces.
The simulated scan path fails to spot such semantically important objects that have not been highlighted as
regions of high contrast in colour, texture and luminance. The area of yellow disks marking human fixations
is proportional to fixation time ( Fixations in FAces dataset).
As a last remark, the variability of visual scan paths has been considered a nuisance
rather than an opportunity from a modelling standpoint. Nevertheless, beside theoretical
relevance for modelling human behavior, the randomness of the process can be an advantage
in computer vision and learning tasks. For instance, Martinez et al. [2008] have reported
that a stochastic attention selection mechanism (a refinement of the algorithm proposed
in Boccignone and Ferraro 2004) enables the i-Cub robot to explore its environment up
to three times faster compared to the standard WTA mechanism [Itti et al. 1998]. Indeed,
stochasticity makes the robot sensitive to new signals and flexibly change its attention,
which in turn enables efficient exploration of the environment as a basis for action learning
[Nagai 2009b; 2009a].
There are few notable exceptions to this current state of affairs, which will be discussed
in Section 3.1.
3. FRAMING MODELS IN A PROBABILISTIC SETTING
We contend with the above issues by stating that observables such as fixation duration
and gaze shift lengths and directions are random variables (RVs) that are generated by
an underlying stochastic process. In other terms, the sequence {rF (1), rF (2), · · ·} is the
realization of a stochastic process, and the ultimate goal of a computational theory is to
develop a mathematical model that describes statistical properties of eye movements as
closely as possible. The problem of answering the question Where to Look Next? in a formal
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way can be conveniently set in a probabilistic Bayesian framework. Tatler and Vincent
[2009] have re-phrased this question in terms of the posterior probability density function
(pdf) P (r | W), which accounts for the plausibility of generating the gaze shift r = rF (t)−
rF (t− 1), after the perceptual evaluation W. Formally, via Bayes’ rule:
P (r | W) = P (W | r)
P (W) P (r). (2)
In Eq. 2, the first term on the r.h.s. accounts for the likelihood P (W | r) of r when
visual data (e.g., features, such as edges or colors) are observed under a gaze shift rF (t)→
rF (t+ 1), normalized by P (W), the evidence of the perceptual evaluation. As they put it,
“The beauty of this approach is that the data could come from a variety of data sources
such as simple feature cues, derivations such as Itti’s definition of salience, object-or other
high-level sources”. The second term is the pdf P (r) incorporating prior knowledge on gaze
shift execution.
The generative model behind Eq. 2 is shown in Fig. 3 shaped in the form of a Probabilistic
Graphical Model (PGM, see Murphy 2012 for an introduction). A PGM is a graph where
nodes (e.g., r and W) denote RVs and directed arcs (arrows) encode conditional dependen-
cies between RVs, e.g P (W | r). A node with no input arcs (for example r) is associated
with a prior probability, e.g., P (r). Technically, as a whole, the PGM specifies at a glance
a chosen factorization of the joint probability of all nodes. Thus, in Fig. 3 we can promptly
read that P (W, r) = P (W | r)P (r). The PGM in Fig. 4 represents the PGM in Fig. 3, but
unrolled in time. Note that now the arc rF (t) → rF (t + 1) makes explicit the dynamics of
the gaze shift occurring with probability P (rF (t+ 1) | rF (t)).
Fig. 3. The generative model in PGM form sup-
porting the Bayesian inference specified via Eq
2
Fig. 4. The dynamic PGM obtained by un-
rolling in time the PGM depicted in Fig. 3
The probabilistic model represented in Fig. 3 is generative in the sense that if all pdfs in-
volved were fully specified, the attentive process could be simulated (via ancestral sampling,
Murphy 2012) as:
(1) Sampling the gaze shift from the prior:
r∗ ∼ P (r); (3)
(2) Sampling the observation of the world under the gaze shift:
W∗ ∼ P (W | r∗). (4)
Inferring the gaze shift r whenW is known boils down to the inverse probability problem
(inverting the arrows), which is solved via Bayes’ rule (Eq. 2). In the remainder of this
paper we will largely use PGMs to simplify the presentation and discussion of probabilistic
models.
We will see in brief (Section 3.2) that many current approaches previously mentioned can
be accounted for by the likelihood term alone. But, crucial, and related to issues raised in
Section 2.2, is the Bayesian prior P (r).
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3.1. The prior, first
The prior P (r) can be defined prima facie as the probability of shifting the gaze to a location
irrespective of the visual information at that location, although the term “irrespective”
should be used with some caution [Le Meur and Coutrot 2016]. Indeed, the prior is apt to
encapsulate any systematic tendency in the manner in which we explore scenes with our
eyes. The striking result obtained by Tatler and Vincent 2009 is that if we learn P (r) from
the actual observer’s behavior, then we can stochastically sample gaze shifts (Eq. 3) so to
obtain scan paths that, blind to visual information, out-perform feature-based accounts of
eye guidance.
Note that the apparent simplicity of the prior term P (r) hides a number of subtleties.
For instance, Tatler and Vincent expand the random vector r in terms of its components,
amplitude l and direction θ. Thus, P (r) = P (l, θ). This simple statement paves the way to
different options.
First easy option: such RVs are marginally independent, thus, P (l, θ) = P (l)P (θ). In
this case, gaze guidance, solely relying on biases, could be simulated by expanding Eq. 3 via
independent sampling of both components, i.e. at each time t, l(t) ∼ P (l(t)), θ(t) ∼ P (θ(t)).
Alternative option: conjecture some kind of dependency, e.g. amplitude on direction so that
P (l, θ) = P (l | θ)P (θ). In this case, the gaze shift sampling procedure would turn into the
sequence θ̂(t) ∼ P (θ(t)), l(t) ∼ P (l(t) | θ̂(t)). Further: assume that there is some persistence
in the direction of the shift, which give rise to a stochastic process in which subsequent
directions are correlated, i.e., θ(t) ∼ P (θ(t) | θ(t− 1)), and so on.
To summarize, by simply taking into account the prior P (r), a richness of possible behav-
iors and analyses are brought into the game. Unfortunately, most computational accounts
of eye movements and visual attention have overlooked this opportunity, with some excep-
tions. For instance, Tavakoli et al. 2013 propose a system model for saccade generation in
a stochastic filtering framework. A prior on amplitude P (l(t)) is considered by learning a
Gaussian mixture model from eye tracking data. This way one aspect of biases is indirectly
taken into account. It is not clear if their model accounts for variability and whether and
how oculomotor statistics compare to human data. In [Kimura et al. 2008], simple eye-
movements patterns are straightforwardly incorporated as a prior of a dynamic Bayesian
network to guide the sequence of eye focusing positions on videos.
In a different vein, Le Meur and Coutrot 2016 have recently addressed in-depth the bias
problem and made the interesting point that viewing tendencies are not universal, but
modulated by the semantic visual category of the stimulus. They learn the joint pdf P (l, θ)
of saccade amplitudes and orientations via kernel density estimation; fixation duration is
not taken into account. The model also brings in variability [Le Meur and Liu 2015] by
generating a number Nc of random locations according to conditional probability P (rF (t) |
rF (t − 1)) and the location with the highest saliency gain is chosen as the next fixation
point. Nc controls the degree of stochasticity.
Others have tried to capture eye movements randomness [Keech and Resca 2010;
Rutishauser and Koch 2007] but limiting to specific tasks such as conjunctive visual search.
A few more exceptions can be found, but only in the very peculiar field of eye-movements
in reading (see Feng 2006, for a discussion).
The variability and bias issues have been explicitly addressed from first principles in the
theoretical context of Le´vy flights [Brockmann and Geisel 2000; Boccignone and Ferraro
2004]. The perceptual component was limited to a minimal core (e.g., based on a bottom-
up salience map) sufficient enough to support the eye guidance component. In particular
in [Boccignone and Ferraro 2004] the long tail, positively skewed distribution of saccade
amplitudes was shaped as a prior in the form of a Cauchy distribution, whilst random-
ness was addressed at the algorithmic level by prior sampling r ∼ P (r(t)) followed by a
Metropolis-like acceptance rule based on a deterministic saliency potential field. The de-
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gree of stochasticity was controlled via the “temperature” parameter of the Metropolis
algorithm. The underlying eye guidance model was that of a random walker exploring the
potential landscape (salience) according to a Langevin-like stochastic differential equation
(SDE). The merit of such equation is the joint treatment of both the deterministic and the
stochastic (variability) components behind eye guidance1.
This basic mechanism has been refined and generalized in [Boccignone and Ferraro 2013]
to composite α-stable or Le´vy random walks (the Cauchy law is but one instance of the class
of α-stable distributions), where, inspired by animal foraging behaviour, a twofold regime
can be distinguished: local exploitation (fixational movements following Brownian motion)
and large exploration/relocation (saccade following Le´vy motion). What is interesting, with
respect to the early model [Boccignone and Ferraro 2004], is that the choice between the
“feed” or “fly” states is made by sampling from a Bernoulli distribution, Bern(z | pi), with
the parameter pi sampled from the conjugate prior Beta(pi | α, β). In turn, the behaviour of
the Beta prior can be shaped via its hyperparameters (α, β), which, in an Empirical Bayes
approximation, can be tuned as a function of the class of perceptual data at hand (in the
vein of Le Meur and Coutrot 2016) and of time spent in feeding (fixation duration). Most
important, this approach paves the way to the possibility of treating visual exploration
strategies in terms of foraging strategies [Wolfe 2013; Cain et al. 2012; Boccignone and
Ferraro 2014; Clavelli et al. 2014; Napoletano et al. 2015]. We will further expand on this
in Section 4.
3.2. The unbearable lightness of the likelihood
We noticed before, by inspecting Eq. 2 that the term P (W|r)P (W) could be related to many models
proposed in the literature. This is an optimistic view. Most of the approaches actually
discard the dynamics of gaze shifts implicitly captured by the shift vector r(t). In practice,
they are more likely to be described by a simplified version of Eq. 2:
P (rF | W) = P (W | rF )
P (W) P (rF ). (5)
The difference between Eq. 2 and 5 is subtle. The posterior P (rF | W) now answers the
query “What is the probability of fixating at location rF given visual data W?” Further,
the prior P (rF ) simply accounts for the probability of spotting location rF . As a matter of
fact, Eq. 5 bears no dynamics.
In probabilistic terms we may re-phrase this result as the outcome of an assumption of
independence: P (r) = P (rF (t) − rF (t − 1)) ' P (rF (t) | rF (t − 1)) = P (rF (t)). To make
things even clearer, let us explicitly substitute rF with a RV L denoting locations in the
scene, and W with RV F denoting features (whatever they may be); then, Eq. 5 boils down
to
P (L | F) = P (F | L)
P (F)
P (L). (6)
The PGM underlying this inferential step is a very simple one and is represented in Figure 5.
A straightforward but principled use of Eq. 6, which has been exploited by approaches that
draw upon techniques borrowed from statistical machine learning [Murphy 2012] is the
following: consider L as a binary RV taking values in [0, 1] (or [−1, 1]), so that P (L = 1 | F)
represents the probability for a pixel, a superpixel or a patch of being classified as salient.
In the case the prior P (L) is assumed to be uniform (no spatial bias, no preferred loca-
tions), then P (L = 1 | F) ' P (F | L = 1). The likelihood function P (F | L = 1) can be
1Matlab simulation is available for download at http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/
38512-visual-scanpaths-via-constrained-levy-exploration-of-a-saliency-landscape
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Fig. 5. PGM representing a feature-based per-
ceptual evaluation component W
Fig. 6. PGM representing a object-based per-
ceptual evaluation component W [Torralba et al.
2006]
Fig. 7. The Bayesian model by Chikkerur et al.
[2010], which maps the PGM structure to brain
areas underpinning visual attention: early visual
areas V1 and V2, V4, lateral intraparietal (LIP),
frontal eye fields (FEF), inferotemporal (IT),
prefrontal cortex (PFC)
Fig. 8. An extension of the PGM by Chikkerur
et al. [2010], cfr. Fig. 7, adopted in [Clavelli et al.
2014] and [Napoletano et al. 2015]. In this case
W explicitly depends on the current gaze posi-
tion rF and goal G.
determined in many ways; e.g., nonparametric kernel density estimation has been addressed
by Seo and Milanfar [2009], who use center / surround local regression kernels for computing
F.
More generally, taking into account the ratio f(L) = P (L=1|F)P (L=0|F) (or, commonly, the log-
ratio) casts the saliency detection problem in a classification problem, in particular a dis-
criminative one [Murphy 2012], for which a variety of learning techniques are readily avail-
able. Kienzle et al. [2006] pioneered this approach by learning the saliency discriminant func-
tion f(L) directly from human eye tracking data using a support vector machine (SVM).
Their approach has paved the way to a relevant number of works from [Judd et al. 2009] –
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who trained a linear SVM from human fixation data using a set of low, middle and high-
level features to define salient locations–, to most recent ones that wholeheartedly endorse
machine learning trends. Henceforth, methods have been proposed relying on sparse repre-
sentation of “feature words” (atoms) encoded in salient and non-salient dictionaries; these
are either learned from local image patches [Yan et al. 2010; Lang et al. 2012] or from eye
tracking data of training images [Jiang et al. 2015]. Graph-based learning is one other trend,
from the seminal work of Harel et al. [2007] to Yu et al. [2014] (see the latter, for a brief
review of this field). Crucially, for the research practice, data-driven learning methods allow
to contend with large scale dynamic datasets. Mathe and Sminchisescu [2015] in the vein
of Kienzle et al. [2006] and Judd et al. [2009] use SVM, but they remarkably exploit state-
of-the art computer vision datasets (Hollywood-2 and UCF Sports) annotated with human
eye movements collected under the ecological constraints of a visual action recognition task.
As a general comment on (discriminative) machine learning-based methods, on the one
hand it is embraceable the criticism by Borji and Itti [2013], who surmise that these tech-
niques make “models data-dependent, thus influencing fair model comparison, slow, and to
some extent, black-box.” But on the other hand, one important lesson of these approaches
lies in that they provides a data-driven way of deriving the most relevant visual features
as optimal predictors. The learned patterns can shape receptive fields (filters) that have
equivalent or superior predictive power when compared against hand-crafted (and some-
times more complicated) models [Kienzle et al. 2009]. Certainly, this lesson is at the base
of the current exponentially growth of methods based on deep learning techniques [LeCun
et al. 2015], in particular Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN, cfr. Srinivas et al. 2016 for
a focused review), where the computed features seem to outperform, at least from an engi-
neering perspective, most of, if not all, the state-of-the art features conceived in computer
vision.
Again, CNNs, as commonly exploited in the current practice, bring no significant con-
ceptual novelty as to the use of Eq. 6: fixation prediction is formulated as a supervised
binary classification problem (in some case, regression is addressed, Wang et al. 2016). For
example, Vig et al. [2014] use a linear SVM for learning the saliency discriminant function
f(L) after a large-scale search for optimal features F. Similarly, Shen and Zhao [2014] detect
salient region via linear SVM fed with features computed from multi-layer sparse network
model. [Lin et al. 2014] use the simple normalization step [Itti et al. 1998] to approximate
P (L = 1 | F), where [Kruthiventi et al. 2015] use the last 1 × 1 convolutional layer of a
fully convolutional net. Cogent here is the outstanding performance of CNN in learning and
representing features that correlate well with eye fixations, like objects, faces, context.
Clearly, one problem is the enormous amount of training data necessary to train these
networks, and the engineering expertise required, which makes them difficult to apply for
predicting saliency. However, Ku¨mmerer et al. [2014] by exploiting the well known network
from [Krizhevsky et al. 2012] as starting point, have given evidence that deep CNN trained
on computer vision tasks like object detection boost saliency prediction. The network by
Krizhevsky et al. [2012] has been optimized for object recognition using a massive dataset
consisting of more than one million images, and results reported by Ku¨mmerer et al. [2014]
on static pictures are impressive when compared to state-of-the-art methods, even to pre-
vious CNN-based proposals [Vig et al. 2014].
Apart from the straightforward implementation via popular machine-learning algorithms,
the “light” model described by Eq. 6 is further amenable to a minimal model, which,
surprisingly enough, is however capable of accounting for a large number of approaches.
This can be easily appreciated by setting P (F | L) = const., P (L) = const. so that Eq. 6
reduces to
P (L | F) ∝ 1
P (F)
. (7)
Publication date: June 2016.
A:12 G. Boccignone
Eq. 7 states that the probability of fixating a spatial location L = (x, y) is higher when
“unlikely” features (unlikeliness ≈ 1P (F) ) occur at that location. In a natural scene, it is
typically the case of high contrast regions (with respect to either luminance, color, texture
or motion). This is nothing but the salience-based component of the most prominent model
in the literature [Itti et al. 1998], which Eq. 7 re-phrases in probabilistic terms.
A thorough reading of the review by Borji and Itti [2013] is sufficient to gain the under-
standing that a great deal of computational models so far proposed (47 over 63 models) are
much or less variations of this theme (albeit experimenting with different features, differ-
ent weights for combining them, etc.) even when sophisticated probabilistic techniques are
adopted to shape the distribution P (F) (e.g., nonparametric Bayes techniques, Boccignone
2008). Clearly, there are works that have tried to avoid weaknesses related to such a light-
modelling of the perceptual input, and have tried to climb up the levels of the representation
hierarchy [Schu¨tz et al. 2011]. Some examples are summarized at a glance in Figure 3.2 (but
see Borji and Itti 2013).
Nevertheless, in spite of its simplicity, Eq. 7 is apt to pave the way to interesting frame-
works. For instance, by noting that log 1P (F) is nothing but Shannon’s Self- Information, in-
formation theoretic approaches become available at the algorithmic level. These approaches
set computational constraints under the general assumption that saliency computation
serves to maximize information sampled from the environment [Bruce and Tsotsos 2009].
Keeping on with the information theory framework, and going back to Eq. 6, a simple
manipulation,
logP (L | F)− logP (L) = log P (F | L)
P (F)
(8)
sets the focus on the discrepancy, or dissimilarity, logP (L | F) − logP (L) = log P (L|F)P (L)
between the log-posterior and the log-prior. A (non-commutative) measure, formalizing
this notion of dissimilarity is readily available in information theory, namely the Kullback-
Leibler (K-L) divergence between two distributions P (X) and Q(X) [MacKay 2002]:
DKL(P (X)||Q(X)) =
∫
X
log
P (x)
Q(x)
P (x)dx (9)
Measuring differences between posterior and prior beliefs of the observers is however a
general concept applicable across different levels of abstraction. For instance, one might
consider the object-based model [Torralba et al. 2006] in Fig. 6, which can be used for
inferring the joint posterior of gazing at certain kinds of objects O at location L of a viewed
scene, namely, P (O,L | F) ∝ P (F | O,L)P (O,L). Then, DKL(P (O,L | F)||P (O,L)) is
the average of the log-odd ratio, measuring the divergence between observer’s prior belief
distribution on (O,L) and his posterior belief distributions after perceptual data F have
been gathered. Indeed, this is a statement that can be generalized to any model M in a
model space M and new data observation D so to define the Bayesian surprise [Baldi and
Itti 2010] S(D,M): D is surprising if the posterior distribution resulting from observing D
significantly differs from the prior distribution, i.e., S(D,M) = DKL(P (M | D)||P (M)). Itti
and Baldi [2009] have shown that Bayesian surprise attracts human attention in dynamic
natural scenes. To recap, Bayesian surprise is a measure of salience based on the K–L
divergence.
Eventually, note that the K-L divergence (9) is a flexible tool and can be used for different
purposes. For instance, when dealing with models of perceptual evaluation such as those
specified in Figs 6, 7, and 8, once the model has been detailed at the computational theory
level via its PGM, then using the latter for learning inference and prediction brings in the
algorithmic level. Indeed, for any Bayesian generative model other than trivial ones, such
steps are usually performed in approximate form [Murphy 2012]. Stochastic approximation
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Fig. 9. The perception-action loop unfolded in time as a dynamic PGM. A(t) denotes the ensemble of
time-varying RVs defining the oculomotor action setting; W(t) stands for the ensemble of time-varying RVs
characterising the scene as actively perceived by the observer; G summarizes the given goal(s), To simplify
the graphics, conditional dependencies G → A(t + 1) and G → W(t + 1) have been omitted.
resorting to algorithms such as Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and Particle Filtering
(PF) is one possible choice; the alternative choice is represented by deterministic optimiza-
tion algorithms [Murphy 2012] such as variational Bayes (VB) or belief propagation (BP, a
message passing scheme exchanging beliefs between PGM nodes). For example, the model
by Chikkerur et al. [2010], following the work of Rao [2005], relies upon BP message pass-
ing for inferential steps. Interestingly enough, Rao [2005] has argued for a plausible neural
implementation of BP. VB algorithms, on the other hand, are based on Eq. 9, where P
usually stands for a complete distribution and Q is the approximating distribution; then,
parameter (or model) learning is accomplished by minimizing the K-L divergence (as an
example, the well known Expectation-Maximization algorithm, EM, can be considered a
specific case of the VB algorithm, MacKay 2002; Murphy 2012). In Section 4 we will also
touch on a deeper interpretation of the K-L minimization / VB algorithm.
But at this point a simple question arises: where have the eye movements gone?
4. MAKING A STEP FORWARD: BACK TO THE BEGINNING OF ACTIVE VISION
Visual perception coupled with gaze shifts should be considered the Drosophila of
perception-action loops. Among the variety of active behaviors the organism can fluently
engage to purposively act upon and perceive the world (e.g, moving the body, turning the
head, manipulating objects), oculomotor behavior is the minimal, least energy, unit. To
perform 3-4 saccades per second, the organism roughly spends 300 msecs to close the loop
(200 msecs for motor preparation and execution, 100 msecs left for perception).
One way to make justice of this forgotten link is going back to first principles by re-
shaping the problem as the action-perception loop, which is presented in Figure 9 in the
form of a dynamic PGM. The model relies upon the following assumptions:
— The scene that will be perceived at time t+ 1, namely W(t+ 1) is inferred from the raw
data I, gazed at rF (t + 1), under the goal G assigned to the observer, and is condition-
ally dependent on current perception W(t). Thus, the perceptual inference problem is
summarised by the conditional distribution P (W(t+ 1)|W(t), rF (t+ 1), I,G);
— The external goal G being assigned, the oculomotor action setting at time t+1, A(t+1),
is drawn conditionally on current action setting A(t) and the perceived scene W(t + 1)
under gaze position rF (t + 1); thus, its evolution in time is inferred according to the
conditional distribution P (A(t+ 1)|A(t),W(t+ 1), rF (t+ 1),G).
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Note that the action setting dynamics A(t)→ A(t+ 1) and the scene perception dynamics
W(t) → W(t + 1) are intertwined with one another by means of the gaze shift process
rF (t)→ rF (t+1): on the one hand next gaze position rF (t+1) is used to define a distribution
onW(t+1) and A(t+1); meanwhile, the probability distribution of rF (t+1) is conditioned
on current gaze position, W(t) and A(t), namely P (rF (t+ 1)|A(t),W(t), rF (t)).
We have previously discussed the perceptual evaluation componentW(t). A general way of
defining the oculomotor executive control component A(t) is through the following ensemble
of RVs:
— {V(t),R(t)}: V(t) is a spatially defined RV used to provide a suitable probabilistic
representation of value; R(t) is a binary RV defining whether or not a payoff (either
positive or negative) is returned;
— {pi(t), z(t), ξ(t)}: an oculomotor state representation as defined via the multinomial RV
z(t), occurring with probability pi(t), and determining the choice of motor parameters
ξ(z, t) guiding the actual gaze relocation (e.g., lenght and direction of a saccade as op-
posed to those driving a smooth pursuit) ;
—D(t): a set of state-dependent statistical decision rules to be applied on a set of candidate
new gaze locations rnew(t+ 1) distributed according to the posterior pdf of rF (t+ 1).
In the end, the actual shift can be summarised as the statistical decision of selecting
a particular gaze location r?F (t + 1) on the basis of P (rF (t + 1)|A(t),W(t), rF (t)) so to
maximize the expected payoff under the current goal G, and the action/perception cycle
boils down to the iteration of the following steps:
(1) Sampling the gaze-dependent current perception:
W∗(t) ∼ P (W(t)|rF (t),F(t), I(t),G); (10)
(2) Sampling the appropriate motor behavior (e.g., fixation or saccade):
A(t)∗ ∼ P (A(t)|A(t− 1),W∗(t),G); (11)
(3) Sampling where to look next:
rF (t+ 1) ∼ P (rF (t+ 1)|A(t)∗,W∗(t), rF (t)). (12)
It is worth noticing that we have chosen to describe the observer’s action / perception
cycle in terms of stochastic sampling based on the probabilistic model in Figure 9. How-
ever, one can recast the inferential problems in terms of deterministic optimization: in brief,
optimising the probabilistic modelW of how sensations are caused, so that the resulting pre-
dictions can select the optimal A to guide active sampling (gaze shift) of sensory data. One
such approach, which is well known in theoretical neuroscience but, surprisingly, hitherto
unconsidered in computer vision, relies on the free-energy principle [Friston 2010; Feldman
and Friston 2010; Friston et al. 2013]. Free-energy F is a quantity from statistical physics
and information theory [MacKay 2002] that bounds the negative log-evidence of sensory
data. Under simplifying assumptions, it boils down to the amount of prediction error of
sensory data under a model. In such context, the action / perception cycle is the result
of a dual minimization process: i) action reduces F by changing sensory input, namely
by sampling (via gaze shifts) what one expects consistent with perceptual inferences; ii)
perception reduces F by making inferences about the causes of sampled sensory signals
and changing predictions. Friston defines this process “active inference”. To make a con-
nection with Section 3.2, by minimizing the free-energy, Bayesian surprise is maximised;
indeed, in Bayesian learning, free energy minimization is a common rationale behind many
optimisation techniques such as VB and BP [MacKay 2002; Murphy 2012]
The sampling scheme proposed is a general one and can be instantiated in different ways.
For instance, in [Boccignone and Ferraro 2014] the sampling step of Eq. 12 is performed
through a generalization of the Langevin SDE equation used in [Boccignone and Ferraro
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2013]. Biases and variability are accounted for by the stochastic component of the equation.
Since dealing with image sequences, the SDE provides operates in different dynamic modes:
pursuit needs to be taken also into account in addition to saccades and fixational movements.
Each mode is governed by a specific set of parameters of the α-stable distribution estimated
from eye tracking data. The choice among modes is accomplished by generalizing the method
proposed in [Boccignone and Ferraro 2014], using a Multinoulli distribution on z(t) and with
parameters pi(t) sampled from the conjugate prior, the Dirichlet distribution. In addition,
the sampling step is used to accomplish an internal simulation step, where a number of
candidates shifts is proposed and the most convenient is selected according to a decision
rule. Also, the gaze dependent perception W can be modeled at any level of complexity
(cfr. example in Figure 13, Section 5). In Boccignone and Ferraro [2014] it is based on
proto-objects sampled from time-varying saliency2. Figure 10 shows an excerpt of typical
results of the model simulation, which compares human variability in gazing (top row) with
that of two “simulated observers” (bottom rows) while viewing the monica03 clip from the
CRCNS eye-1 dataset.
In Clavelli et al. [2014] and Napoletano et al. [2015] the perceptual evaluation component
is extended to handle objects and task (external goal) levels by expanding on Chikkerur
et al. [2010] (cfr. Figure 3.2), and the decision rule D(t) concerning the selection of the gaze
is based on the expected reward according to the given goal G (see Section 5).
Meanwhile, nothing prevents to conceive more general perceptual evaluation and exec-
utive control components, by considering perceptual and action modalities other than the
visual ones in the vein of Coen-Cagli et al. [2009; Coen-Cagli et al. [2008], where eye move-
ments and hand actions have been coupled with the goal of performing a drawing task.
But most important, the action-perception cycle is by and large conceived in the forag-
ing framework (see Bartumeus and Catalan 2009, for a thorough introduction), which at
the most general level is summarized in Table I. Visual foraging corresponds to the time-
varying overt deployment of visual attention achieved through oculomotor actions, namely,
gaze shifts. The forager feeds on patchily distributed preys or resources, spends its time
traveling between patches or searching and handling food within patches. While searching,
it gradually depletes the food, hence, the benefit of staying in the patch is likely to gradually
diminish with time. Moment to moment, striving to maximize its foraging efficiency and
energy intake, the forager should make decisions: Which is the best patch to search? Which
prey, if any, should be chased within the patch? When to leave the current patch for a richer
one?
The spatial behavioral patterns exhibited by foraging animals (but also those detected in
human mobility data) are remarkably close to those generated by gaze shifts [Viswanathan
et al. 2011]. Figure 11 presents an intriguing example in this respect.
The fact that the physics underlying foraging overlaps with that of several other kinds of
complex random searches and stochastic optimization problems [Viswanathan et al. 2011],
and notably with that of visual exploration via gaze shifts [Viswanathan et al. 2011; Marlow
et al. 2015; Brockmann and Geisel 2000], makes available a variety of analytical tools beyond
classic metrics exploited in computer vision or psychology. For instance, in Figure 12, it
is shown how the gaze shift amplitude modes from human observers can be compared
with those generated via simulation by using the complementary Cumulative Distribution
Function (CCDF), which provides a precise description of the distribution of the gaze shift
by considering its upper tail behavior. This can be defined as F (x) = P (|r| > x) = 1−F (x),
where F is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of amplitudes. Consideration of the
upper tail, i.e. the CCDF of jump lengths is a standard convention in foraging, human
mobility, and anomalous diffusion research [Viswanathan et al. 2011].
2Matlab simulation is available for download at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290816849
Ecological sampling of gaze shifts Matlab code
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Fig. 10. Top row: gaze positions (centers of the enhanced colored circles ) recorded from different observers
on different frames of the monica03 clip from the CRCNS eye-1 dataset, University of South California
(freely available online). Middle and bottom rows show, on the same frames, the fovea position of two
“observers” simulated by the method described in [Boccignone and Ferraro 2014].
To sum up, foraging offers a novel perspective for formulating models and related evalu-
ations of visual attention and oculomotor behavior [Wolfe 2013]. Unifying hypotheses such
as the oculomotor continuum from exploration to fixation by Otero-Millan et al. [2013] can
be reconsidered in the light of fundamental theorems of statistical mechanics [Weron and
Magdziarz 2010].
Interestingly enough, the reformulation of visual attention in terms of foraging theory
is not simply an informing metaphor. It has been argued that what was once foraging for
tangible resources in a physical space became, over evolutionary time, foraging in cognitive
space for information related to those resources [Hills 2006], and such adaptations play a
fundamental role in goal-directed deployment of visual attention [Wolfe 2013].
5. BRINGING VALUE INTO THE GAME: A DOORWAY TO AFFECTIVE MODULATION
The introduction of a goal level, either exogenous (originating from outside the observer’s
organism) or endogenous (internal) is not an innocent shift.
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Fig. 11. Monkey or human: can you tell the difference? The center image has been obtained by superim-
posing a typical trajectory of spider monkeys foraging in the forest of the Mexican Yucatan, as derived from
[Ramos-Fernandez et al. 2004], on the “party picture” (left image) used in [Brockmann and Geisel 2000].
The right image is an actual human scan path (modified after Brockmann and Geisel 2000)
Fig. 12. Analysis of gaze shift dynamics from the monica03 video. The left column shows the double log
plot of the CCDF obtained from the gaze magnitude distribution of all subjects: i) the smooth-pursuit mode
(top row); ii) the small saccade mode (middle); iii) large saccades (bottom). The right column presents the
equivalent CCDFs obtained via model simulation.
From a classical cognitive perspective, the assignment of a task to the observer implicitly
defines a value for every point of the space, in the sense that information in some points is
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Table I. Relationship between Attentive vision and Foraging
Video stream attentive processing Patchy landscape foraging
Observer Forager
Observer’s gaze shift Forager’s relocation
Region of interest Patch
Proto-object Candidate prey
Detected object Prey
Region selection Patch choice
Deploying attention to object Prey choice and handling
Disengaging from object Prey leave
Region leave Patch leave or giving-up
more relevant than in others for the completion of the task; the shifting of the gaze on a
particular point, in turn, determines the payoff that can be gained.
There is a number of psychological and neurobiological studies showing the availability of
value maps and loci of reward influencing the final gaze shift [Platt and Glimcher 1999; Leon
and Shadlen 1999; Ikeda and Hikosaka 2003; Hikosaka et al. 2006]. The payoff is nothing
else that the value, with respect to the completion of the task, obtained by moving the
fovea in a given position. Thus points associated with high values produce, when fixated,
high payoffs since these fixations bring the observer closer to her/his goal. For instance,
in [Clavelli et al. 2014] and in [Napoletano et al. 2015], reward was introduced to make a
choice among the candidate gaze shifts stochastically sampled according to Eq. 12, in terms
of expected reward (e.g., tuned by the probability of finding the task-assigned object).
Figure 13 presents one example of the different scan paths obtained by progressively
reducing the levels of representation in the perceptual evaluation component presented in
Figure 8 [Clavelli et al. 2014; Napoletano et al. 2015].
Value set by the given goal can weight differently the objects within the scene, thus
purposively biasing the scan path. Gaze is still uniformly deployed to relevant items within
the scene (people, text) when object-based representation is exploited. When salience alone
is used, the generated scan path fails in accounting for the relevant items and bears no
relation with the semantics which can be attributed to the scene.
The use of value and reward endow attentive models with the capability of handling
complex task. For instance, Clavelli et al. [2014] considered the goal of text spotting in
unconstrained urban environments, and its validation encompassed data gathered from a
mobile eye tracking device [Clavelli 2014]. Napoletano et al. [2015] extended the foraging
framework to cope with the difficult problem of attentive monitoring of multiple video
streams in a videosurveillance setting.
Yet, developing eye guidance models based on reward is a difficult endeavour and com-
putational models that use reward and uncertainty as central components are still in their
infancy (but see the discussion by Tatler et al. 2011). In this respect the remarkable work
by Ballard and collegues counters the stream. Whilst salience, proto-objects and objects are
representations that have been largely addressed in the context of human eye movements,
albeit with different emphasis, in contrast, value has been neglected until recently [Schu¨tz
et al. 2011]. One reason is that in the real world there is seldom direct payoff (no orange
juice for a primary reward) for making good eye movements or punishment for bad ones.
However, the high attentional priority of ecologically pertinent stimuli can also be ex-
plained by mechanisms that do not implicate learning value through repeated pairings with
reward. For example, a bias to attend to socially relevant stimuli is evident from infancy
[Anderson 2013]. More generally, the selection of stimuli by attention has important im-
plications for the survival and wellbeing of an organism, and attentional priority reflects
the overall value of such selection (see Anderson 2013 for a discussion). Indeed, engaging
attention with potentially harmful and beneficial stimuli guarantees that the relevant ones
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Fig. 13. Different scan paths originated from the progressive reduction of representation levels in the
perceptual evaluation component presented in Figure 8.
are selected early so to gauge the exact nature of the potential threat or opportunity and
to readily initiate defensive or approach behavior.
Under these circumstances, Maunsell [2004] has proposed a broad definition of reward,
which includes “not only the immediate primary rewards, but also other factors: the pref-
erence for a novel location or stimulus, the satisfaction of performing well or the desire to
complete a given task.” Such definition is consistent with the different psychological facets of
reward [Berridge and Robinson 2003]: i) learning (including explicit and implicit knowledge
produced by associative conditioning and cognitive processes); ii) affect or emotion (implicit
“liking” and conscious pleasure); iii) motivation (implicit incentive salience “wanting” and
cognitive incentive goals). Thus, value representation level is central to both goal-driven
affective and cognitive engagement with stimuli in the outside world.
In this broader perspective, the effort to put value and reward into the game shows his
inner worth in that, by accounting for the many aspects of “biological value” - salience,
significance, unpredictability, affective content - , it paves the way to a wider dimension
of information processing, as most recent results on the affective modulation of the visual
processing stream advocate [Pessoa 2008; Pessoa and Adolphs 2010], and to the effective
exploitation of computational attention models in the emerging domain of social signal
processing [Vinciarelli et al. 2009].
A number of important studies in the psychological literature (see, for a discussion, Num-
menmaa et al. 2006; Humphrey et al. 2012) have addressed the relationship between overt
attention behavior and emotional content of pictures. Many of them investigate specific
issues related to individuals such as trait anxiety, social anxiety, spider phobia, and exploit
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restricted sets of stimuli such as emotional faces or spiders. In turn, the study by Num-
menmaa et al. [2006] has exploited natural images and normal subjects, demonstrating an
emotional bias both in attentional orienting and engagement among normal participants
and using a wider range of emotional pictures. Results might be summarised as follows: i)
emotionally pleasant and unpleasant pictures capture attention more readily than neutral
pictures; ii) the emotional bias can be observed early in initial orienting and subsequent
engagement of attention; iii) the early stimulus-driven attentional capture by emotional
stimuli can be counteracted by goal-driven control in later stages of picture processing.
Peculiarly relevant to our case, Humphrey et al. [2012] have shown that visual saliency
does influence eye movements, but the effect is reliably reduced when an emotional object is
present. Pictures containing negative objects were recognized more accurately and recalled
in greater detail, and participants fixated more on negative objects than positive or neutral
ones. Initial fixations were more likely to be on emotional objects than more visually salient
neutral ones. Consistently with Nummenmaa et al. [2006], the overall result suggest that
the processing of emotional features occurs at a very early stage of perception.
As a matter of fact, emotional factors are completely neglected in the realm of computa-
tional models of attention and gaze shifts. Some efforts have been spent in the field of social
robotics, where motivational drives have an indirect influence on attention by influencing
the behavioral context, which, in turn, is used to directly manipulate the gains of the atten-
tion system (e.g. by tuning the gains of different bottom-up saliency map, Breazeal et al.
2001). Yet, beyond these broadly related attempts, taking into account the specific influ-
ence of affect on eye-behaviour is not a central concern within this field (for a wide review,
see Ferreira and Dias 2014). Recent works in the image processing and pattern recognition
community use eye tracking data for the inverse problem of the recognition of emotional
content of images (e.g.,Tavakoli et al. 2014; R.-Tavakoli et al. 2015) or implicit tagging of
videos [Soleymani et al. 2012]. Thus, they do not address the generative problem of how
emotional factors contribute to the generation of gaze shifts in visual tasks.
By contrast, neuroscience has shown that, crucially, cognitive and emotional contributions
cannot be separated, as outlined in Figure 14.
The scheme presented, which summarises an ongoing debate [Pessoa 2008], shows that
responses from early and late visual cortex reflecting stimulus significance will be a result
of simultaneous top-down modulation from fronto-parietal attentional regions (LPFC) and
emotional modulation from the amygdala [Mohanty and Sussman 2013]. On the one hand,
stimulus’ affective value appears to drive attention and enhance the processing of emotion-
ally modulated information. On the other hand, exogenously driven attention influences the
outcome of affectively significant stimuli [Pessoa 2008]. As a prominent result, the cognitive
or affective origin of the modulation is lost and stimulus’ effect on behaviour is both cog-
nitive and emotional. At the same time, the cognitive control system (LPFC, ACC) guides
behaviour while maintaining and manipulating goal-related information; however strategies
for action dynamically incorporate value through the mediation of the nucleus accumbens,
the amygdala, and the OFC. Eventually, basal forebrain cholinergic neurons provide regu-
lation of arousal and attention [Goard and Dan 2009], while dopamine neurons located in
the vTA modulate the prediction and expectation of future rewards [Pessoa 2008].
It is to be noted in Figure 14 the central role of the amygdala and the OFC. It has been
argued [Salzman and Fusi 2010] that their tight interaction provides a suitable ground for
representing, at the psychological level the core affect dimensions [Russell 2003] of valence
(pleasure–displeasure conveyed by the visual stimuli) and arousal (activation–deactivation).
From a computational standpoint, the observer’s core affect can in principle be modelled as
a dynamic latent space [Vitale et al. 2014], which we surmise might be readily embedded
within the loop as proposed in Fig. 15. This way, gaze shifts would benefit from the crucial
emotional mediation between the action control and perceptual evaluation components.
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Fig. 14. Circuits for the processing of visual information and for the executive control [Pessoa 2008] show
that action and perception components are inextricably linked through the mediation of the amygdala
and the posterior orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). These structures are considered to be the neural substrate
of emotional valence and arousal [Salzman and Fusi 2010]. The ventral tegmental area (vTA) and the
basal forebrain are responsible for diffuse neuromodulatory effects related to reward and attention. Anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) is likely to be involved in conflict detection and/or error monitoring but also in
in computing the benefits and costs of acting by encoding the probability of reward. Nucleus accumbens
is usually related to motivation.The lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) plays a central role at the cognitive
level in maintaining and manipulating information, but also integrates this content with both affective and
motivational information. Line thickness depicts approximate connection strength
6. CONCLUSION
Time is ripe to abandon the marshland of mass production and evaluation of bottom-up
saliency techniques. Such boundless effort is partially based on a fatally flawed assumption
[Santini and Dumitrescu 2008]: that visual data have a meaning per se, which can be derived
as a function of a certain representation of the data themselves. Meaning is an outcome of an
interpretative process rather than a property of the viewed scene. It is the act of perceiving,
contextual and situated, that gives a scene its meaning [Wittgenstein 2010].
The course of modelling can be more fruitfully directed not only to climb the hierar-
chy of representation levels and to cope with overlooked aspects of eye guidance, but to
eventually reappraise the observer within his natural setting: an active observer compelled
to purposively exploit visual attention for accomplishing real-world tasks [Merleau–Ponty
1945].
REFERENCES
John Aloimonos, Isaac Weiss, and Amit Bandyopadhyay. 1988. Active vision. International journal of
computer vision 1, 4 (1988), 333–356.
Brian A Anderson. 2013. A value-driven mechanism of attentional selection. Journal of vision 13, 3 (2013).
Ruzena Bajcsy and Mario Campos. 1992. Active and exploratory perception. CVGIP: Image Understanding
56, 1 (1992), 31–40.
P. Baldi and L. Itti. 2010. Of bits and wows: A Bayesian theory of surprise with applications to attention.
Neural Networks 23, 5 (2010), 649–666.
D.H. Ballard. 1991. Animate vision. Artificial intelligence 48, 1 (1991), 57–86.
Publication date: June 2016.
A:22 G. Boccignone
Fig. 15. The perception-action loop unfolded in time as a dynamic PGM as in Figure 9, but integrated
with the core affect latent dimension abstracted as the RV E(t). C(t) stands for a higher cognitive control
RV. To simplify the graphics, conditional dependencies G → A(t+ 1) and G → W(t+ 1) have been omitted.
F. Bartumeus and J. Catalan. 2009. Optimal search behavior and classic foraging theory. Journal of Physics
A: Mathematical and Theoretical 42 (2009), 434002.
M. Begum, F. Karray, G.K.I. Mann, and R.G. Gosine. 2010. A probabilistic model of overt visual attention
for cognitive robots. Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics, IEEE Transactions on 40,
5 (2010), 1305–1318.
Kent C Berridge and Terry E Robinson. 2003. Parsing reward. Trends in neurosciences 26, 9 (2003), 507–
513.
G. Boccignone. 2008. Nonparametric Bayesian attentive video analysis. In Proc. 19th International Con-
ference on Pattern Recognition, ICPR 2008. IEEE Press, 1–4.
G. Boccignone and M. Ferraro. 2004. Modelling gaze shift as a constrained random walk. Physica A:
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 331, 1-2 (2004), 207–218.
Giuseppe Boccignone and Mario Ferraro. 2013. Feed and fly control of visual scanpaths for foveation image
processing. annals of telecommunications-annales des te´le´communications 68, 3-4 (2013), 201–217.
Giuseppe Boccignone and Mario Ferraro. 2014. Ecological Sampling of Gaze Shifts. IEEE Trans. on Cyber-
netics 44, 2 (Feb 2014), 266–279.
G. Boccignone, A. Marcelli, P. Napoletano, G. Di Fiore, G. Iacovoni, and S. Morsa. 2008. Bayesian integra-
tion of face and low-level cues for foveated video coding. IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems
for Video Technology 18, 12 (2008), 1727–1740.
Ali Borji, Ming-Ming Cheng, Huaizu Jiang, and Jia Li. 2014. Salient object detection: A survey. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1411.5878 (2014).
A. Borji and L. Itti. 2013. State-of-the-Art in Visual Attention Modeling. IEEE Transactions on Pattern
Analysis and Machine Intelligence 35, 1 (2013), 185–207.
Ali Borji, Dicky N Sihite, and Laurent Itti. 2012. An Object-Based Bayesian Framework for Top-Down
Visual Attention. In Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Cynthia Breazeal, Aaron Edsinger, Paul Fitzpatrick, and Brian Scassellati. 2001. Active vision for sociable
robots. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans 31, 5
(2001), 443–453.
D. Brockmann and T. Geisel. 2000. The ecology of gaze shifts. Neurocomputing 32, 1 (2000), 643–650.
Neil DB Bruce and John K Tsotsos. 2009. Saliency, attention, and visual search: An information theoretic
approach. Journal of vision 9, 3 (2009), 5–5.
Publication date: June 2016.
A probabilistic tour of visual attention A:23
Neil DB Bruce, Calden Wloka, Nick Frosst, Shafin Rahman, and John K Tsotsos. 2015. On computational
modeling of visual saliency: Examining what’s right, and what’s left. Vision research 116 (2015), 95–112.
Z Bylinskii, EM DeGennaro, R Rajalingham, H Ruda, J Zhang, and JK Tsotsos. 2015. Towards the quan-
titative evaluation of visual attention models. Vision research 116 (2015), 258–268.
Matthew S Cain, Edward Vul, Kait Clark, and Stephen R Mitroff. 2012. A Bayesian optimal foraging model
of human visual search. Psychological science 23, 9 (2012), 1047–1054.
R.L. Canosa. 2009. Real-world vision: Selective perception and task. ACM Transactions on Applied Per-
ception 6, 2 (2009), 11.
M. Cerf, E.P. Frady, and C. Koch. 2009. Faces and text attract gaze independent of the task: Experimental
data and computer model. Journal of Vision 9, 12 (2009).
M. Cerf, J. Harel, W. Einha¨user, and C. Koch. 2008. Predicting human gaze using low-level saliency com-
bined with face detection. Advances in neural information processing systems 20 (2008).
D. A. Chernyak and L. W. Stark. 2001. Top–Down Guided Eye Movements. IEEE Trans. Systems Man
Cybernetics - B 31 (2001), 514–522.
S. Chikkerur, T. Serre, C. Tan, and T. Poggio. 2010. What and where: A Bayesian inference theory of
attention. Vision research 50, 22 (2010), 2233–2247.
Antonio Clavelli. 2014. A computational model of eye guidance, searching for text in real scene images.
Ph.D. Dissertation. Universitat Auto´noma de Barcelona. Departament de Cie´ncies de la Computacio´.
http://ddd.uab.cat/record/127173
Antonio Clavelli, Dimosthenis Karatzas, Josep Llado´s, Mario Ferraro, and Giuseppe Boccignone. 2014.
Modelling Task-Dependent Eye Guidance to Objects in Pictures. Cognitive Computation 6, 3 (2014),
558–584.
Ruben Coen-Cagli, Paolo Coraggio, Paolo Napoletano, and Giuseppe Boccignone. 2008. What the draughts-
man’s hand tells the draughtsman’s eye: A sensorimotor account of drawing. International Journal of
Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence 22, 05 (2008), 1015–1029.
Ruben Coen-Cagli, Paolo Coraggio, Paolo Napoletano, Odelia Schwartz, Mario Ferraro, and Giuseppe Boc-
cignone. 2009. Visuomotor characterization of eye movements in a drawing task. Vision research 49, 8
(2009), 810–818.
Roberto Cordeschi. 2002. The discovery of the artificial: Behavior, mind and machines before and beyond
cybernetics. Vol. 28. Springer Science & Business Media.
G.C.H.E. deCroon, E.O. Postma, and H. J. van den Herik. 2011. Adaptive Gaze Control for Object Detec-
tion. Cognitive Computation 3 (2011), 264–278.
M. Dorr, T. Martinetz, K.R. Gegenfurtner, and E. Barth. 2010. Variability of eye movements when viewing
dynamic natural scenes. Journal of Vision 10, 10 (2010).
Wolfgang Einha¨user, Merrielle Spain, and Pietro Perona. 2008. Objects predict fixations better than early
saliency. Journal of Vision 8, 14 (2008). DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/8.14.18
Lior Elazary and Laurent Itti. 2010. A Bayesian model for efficient visual search and recognition. Vision
research 50, 14 (2010), 1338–1352.
S.R. Ellis and L. Stark. 1986. Statistical dependency in visual scanning. Human Factors: The Journal of
the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 28, 4 (1986), 421–438.
Harriet Feldman and Karl Friston. 2010. Attention, uncertainty, and free-energy. Frontiers in human neu-
roscience 4 (2010), 215.
G. Feng. 2006. Eye movements as time-series random variables: A stochastic model of eye movement control
in reading. Cognitive Systems Research 7, 1 (2006), 70–95.
Joao Filipe Ferreira and Joana Dias. 2014. Attentional Mechanisms for Socially Interactive Robots–A Survey.
IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development 6, 2 (2014), 110–125.
Tom Foulsham and Geoffrey Underwood. 2008. What can saliency models predict about eye movements?
Spatial and sequential aspects of fixations during encoding and recognition. Journal of Vision 8, 2
(2008).
Karl Friston. 2010. The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11, 2
(2010), 127–138.
Karl Friston, Philipp Schwartenbeck, Thomas Fitzgerald, Michael Moutoussis, Tim Behrens, and Raymond J
Dolan. 2013. The anatomy of choice: active inference and agency. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7
(2013), 598.
Michael Goard and Yang Dan. 2009. Basal forebrain activation enhances cortical coding of natural scenes.
Nature neuroscience 12, 11 (2009), 1444–1449.
Publication date: June 2016.
A:24 G. Boccignone
S.S. Hacisalihzade, L.W. Stark, and J.S. Allen. 1992. Visual perception and sequences of eye movement
fixations: A stochastic modeling approach. IEEE Trans. Syst., Man, Cybern. 22, 3 (1992), 474–481.
J. Harel, C. Koch, and P. Perona. 2007. Graph-based visual saliency. In Advances in neural information
processing systems, Vol. 19. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 545–552.
Okihide Hikosaka, Kae Nakamura, and Hiroyuki Nakahara. 2006. Basal Ganglia Orient Eyes to Reward.
Journal of Neurophysiology 95, 2 (2006), 567–584.
Thomas T Hills. 2006. Animal Foraging and the Evolution of Goal-Directed Cognition. Cognitive Science
30, 1 (2006), 3–41.
Katherine Humphrey, Geoffrey Underwood, and Tony Lambert. 2012. Salience of the lambs: A test of
the saliency map hypothesis with pictures of emotive objects. Journal of Vision 12, 1 (2012), 22.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/12.1.22
Takuro Ikeda and Okihide Hikosaka. 2003. Reward-dependent gain and bias of visual responses in primate
superior colliculus. Neuron 39, 4 (2003), 693–700.
L. Itti and P. Baldi. 2009. Bayesian surprise attracts human attention. Vision research 49, 10 (2009),
1295–1306.
L. Itti, C. Koch, and E. Niebur. 1998. A Model of Saliency-based Visual Attention for Rapid Scene Analysis.
IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 20 (1998), 1254–1259.
Lai Jiang, Mai Xu, Zhaoting Ye, and Zulin Wang. 2015. Image Saliency Detection With Sparse Represen-
tation of Learnt Texture Atoms. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer
Vision Workshops. 54–62.
Tilke Judd, Krista Ehinger, Fre´do Durand, and Antonio Torralba. 2009. Learning to predict where humans
look. In IEEE 12th International conference on Computer Vision. IEEE, 2106–2113.
TD Keech and L. Resca. 2010. Eye movements in active visual search: A computable phenomenological
model. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics 72, 2 (2010), 285–307.
Wolf Kienzle, Matthias O Franz, Bernhard Scho¨lkopf, and Felix A Wichmann. 2009. Center-surround pat-
terns emerge as optimal predictors for human saccade targets. Journal of vision 9, 5 (2009), 7–7.
Wolf Kienzle, Felix A Wichmann, Matthias O Franz, and Bernhard Scho¨lkopf. 2006. A nonparametric
approach to bottom-up visual saliency. In Advances in neural information processing systems. 689–
696.
A. Kimura, D. Pang, T. Takeuchi, J. Yamato, and K. Kashino. 2008. Dynamic Markov random fields for
stochastic modeling of visual attention. In Proc. ICPR ’08. IEEE, 1–5.
E. Kowler. 2011. Eye movements: The past 25 years. Vision Research 51, 13 (2011), 1457–1483. 50th
Anniversary Special Issue of Vision Research - Volume 2.
Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E. Hinton. 2012. ImageNet Classification with Deep Con-
volutional Neural Networks. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 25, F. Pereira,
C. J. C. Burges, L. Bottou, and K. Q. Weinberger (Eds.). Curran Associates, Inc., 1097–1105. http:
//papers.nips.cc/paper/4824-imagenet-classification-with-deep-convolutional-neural-networks.pdf
Srinivas SS Kruthiventi, Kumar Ayush, and R Venkatesh Babu. 2015. DeepFix: A Fully Convolutional
Neural Network for predicting Human Eye Fixations. arXiv preprint arXiv:1510.02927 (2015).
Matthias Ku¨mmerer, Lucas Theis, and Matthias Bethge. 2014. Deep Gaze I: Boosting saliency prediction
with feature maps trained on ImageNet. arXiv preprint arXiv:1411.1045 (2014).
Matthias Ku¨mmerer, Thomas SA Wallis, and Matthias Bethge. 2015. Information-theoretic model compar-
ison unifies saliency metrics. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112, 52 (2015), 16054–
16059.
Congyan Lang, Guangcan Liu, Jian Yu, and Shuicheng Yan. 2012. Saliency detection by multitask sparsity
pursuit. IEEE Transactions on Image Processing 21, 3 (2012), 1327–1338.
Olivier Le Meur and Antoine Coutrot. 2016. Introducing context-dependent and spatially-variant viewing
biases in saccadic models. Vision Research 121 (2016), 72–84.
Olivier Le Meur and Zhi Liu. 2015. Saccadic model of eye movements for free-viewing condition. Vision
research 116 (2015), 152–164.
Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey Hinton. 2015. Deep learning. Nature 521, 7553 (2015), 436–444.
Matthew I Leon and Michael N Shadlen. 1999. Effect of expected reward magnitude on the response of
neurons in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of the macaque. Neuron 24, 2 (1999), 415–425.
Yuetan Lin, Shu Kong, Donghui Wang, and Yueting Zhuang. 2014. Saliency detection within a deep convo-
lutional architecture. In Workshops at the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
D.J.C. MacKay. 2002. Information Theory, Inference and Learning Algorithms. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK.
Publication date: June 2016.
A probabilistic tour of visual attention A:25
Sophie Marat, Anis Rahman, Denis Pellerin, Nathalie Guyader, and Dominique Houzet. 2013. Improving
Visual Saliency by Adding Face Feature Mapand Center Bias. Cognitive Computation 5, 1 (2013),
63–75.
Colleen A Marlow, Indre V Viskontas, Alisa Matlin, Cooper Boydston, Adam Boxer, and Richard P Taylor.
2015. Temporal Structure of Human Gaze Dynamics Is Invariant During Free Viewing. PloS one 10, 9
(2015), e0139379.
D. Marr. 1982. Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of
Visual Information. W.H. Freeman, New York.
H. Martinez, M. Lungarella, and R. Pfeifer. 2008. Stochastic Extension to the Attention-Selection System
for the iCub. University of Zurich, Tech. Rep (2008).
Stefan Mathe and Cristian Sminchisescu. 2015. Actions in the eye: dynamic gaze datasets and learnt saliency
models for visual recognition. Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE Transactions on 37,
7 (2015), 1408–1424.
John HR Maunsell. 2004. Neuronal representations of cognitive state: reward or attention? Trends in cog-
nitive sciences 8, 6 (2004), 261–265.
Maurice Merleau–Ponty. 1945. Phe´nome´nologie de la perception. Gallimard, Paris.
Aprajita Mohanty and Tamara J Sussman. 2013. Top-down modulation of attention by emotion. Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience 7, 102 (2013). http://www.frontiersin.org/human neuroscience/10.3389/fnhum.
2013.00102/full
Kevin P Murphy. 2012. Machine learning: a probabilistic perspective. MIT press, Cambridge, MA.
Y. Nagai. 2009a. From bottom-up visual attention to robot action learning. In Proceedings of 8 IEEE
International Conference on Development and Learning. IEEE Press.
Y. Nagai. 2009b. Stability and sensitivity of bottom-up visual attention for dynamic scene analysis. In
Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/RSJ international conference on Intelligent robots and systems. IEEE
Press, 5198–5203.
J. Najemnik and W.S. Geisler. 2005. Optimal eye movement strategies in visual search. Nature 434, 7031
(2005), 387–391.
P. Napoletano, G. Boccignone, and F. Tisato. 2015. Attentive monitoring of multiple video streams driven
by a Bayesian foraging strategy. IEEE Trans. on Image Processing 24, 11 (Nov. 2015), 3266 – 3281.
Lauri Nummenmaa, Jukka Hyo¨na¨, and Manuel G Calvo. 2006. Eye movement assessment of selective at-
tentional capture by emotional pictures. Emotion 6, 2 (2006), 257.
Jorge Otero-Millan, Stephen L Macknik, Rachel E Langston, and Susana Martinez-Conde. 2013. An oculo-
motor continuum from exploration to fixation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110,
15 (2013), 6175–6180.
E.A.B. Over, I.T.C. Hooge, B.N.S. Vlaskamp, and C.J. Erkelens. 2007. Coarse-to-fine eye movement strategy
in visual search. Vision Research 47 (2007), 2272–2280.
Luiz Pessoa. 2008. On the relationship between emotion and cognition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 9, 2
(2008), 148–158.
Luiz Pessoa and Ralph Adolphs. 2010. Emotion processing and the amygdala: from a’low road’to’many
roads’ of evaluating biological significance. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11, 11 (2010), 773–783.
Michael L Platt and Paul W Glimcher. 1999. Neural correlates of decision variables in parietal cortex.
Nature 400, 6741 (1999), 233–238.
Claudio M Privitera. 2006. The scanpath theory: its definitions and later developments. In Electronic Imag-
ing 2006. International Society for Optics and Photonics, 60570A–60570A.
Hamed R.-Tavakoli, Adham Atyabi, Antti Rantanen, Seppo J. Laukka, Samia Nefti-Meziani, and Janne
Heikkil? 2015. Predicting the Valence of a Scene from Observers? Eye Movements. PLoS ONE 10, 9
(09 2015), 1–19. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0138198
G. Ramos-Fernandez, J.L. Mateos, O. Miramontes, G. Cocho, H. Larralde, and B. Ayala-Orozco. 2004. Le´vy
walk patterns in the foraging movements of spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi). Behavioral Ecology and
Sociobiology 55, 3 (2004), 223–230.
R.P.N. Rao. 2005. Bayesian inference and attentional modulation in the visual cortex. Neuroreport 16, 16
(2005), 1843.
Rajesh P.N. Rao, Gregory J. Zelinsky, Mary M. Hayhoe, and Dana H. Ballard. 2002. Eye movements in
iconic visual search. Vision Research 42, 11 (2002), 1447 – 1463.
R.A. Rensink. 2000. The dynamic representation of scenes. Visual Cognition 1, 3 (2000), 17–42.
Albert L Rothenstein and John K Tsotsos. 2008. Attention links sensing to recognition. Image and Vision
Computing 26, 1 (2008), 114–126.
Publication date: June 2016.
A:26 G. Boccignone
C.A. Rothkopf, D.H. Ballard, and M.M. Hayhoe. 2007. Task and context determine where you look. Journal
of Vision 7, 14 (2007).
James A Russell. 2003. Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. Psychological review 110,
1 (2003), 145.
U. Rutishauser and C. Koch. 2007. Probabilistic modeling of eye movement data during conjunction search
via feature-based attention. Journal of Vision 7, 6 (2007).
C Daniel Salzman and Stefano Fusi. 2010. Emotion, cognition, and mental state representation in amygdala
and prefrontal cortex. Annual review of neuroscience 33 (2010), 173.
Simone Santini and Alexandra Dumitrescu. 2008. Context as a non-ontological determinant of semantics.
In Semantic Multimedia. Springer, 121–136.
A.C. Schu¨tz, D.I. Braun, and K.R. Gegenfurtner. 2011. Eye movements and perception: A selective review.
Journal of Vision 11, 5 (2011).
HJ Seo and P. Milanfar. 2009. Static and space-time visual saliency detection by self-resemblance. Journal
of Vision 9, 12 (2009), 1–27.
Chengyao Shen and Qi Zhao. 2014. Learning to predict eye fixations for semantic contents using multi-layer
sparse network. Neurocomputing 138 (2014), 61–68.
Mohammad Soleymani, Jeroen Lichtenauer, Thierry Pun, and Maja Pantic. 2012. A multimodal database
for affect recognition and implicit tagging. Affective Computing, IEEE Transactions on 3, 1 (2012),
42–55.
Suraj Srinivas, Ravi Kiran Sarvadevabhatla, Konda Reddy Mopuri, Nikita Prabhu, Srinivas Kruthiventi, and
Venkatesh Babu Radhakrishnan. 2016. A taxonomy of Deep Convolutional Neural Nets for Computer
Vision. Frontiers in Robotics and AI 2, 36 (2016). DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2015.00036
Hans Strasburger, Ingo Rentschler, and Martin Ju¨ttner. 2011. Peripheral vision and pattern recognition: A
review. Journal of Vision 11, 5 (2011).
Yaoru Sun, Robert Fisher, Fang Wang, and Herman Martins Gomes. 2008. A computer vision model for
visual-object-based attention and eye movements. Computer Vision and Image Understanding 112, 2
(2008), 126 – 142.
B.W. Tatler, M.M. Hayhoe, M.F. Land, and D.H. Ballard. 2011. Eye guidance in natural vision: Reinter-
preting salience. Journal of vision 11, 5 (2011).
B.W. Tatler and B.T. Vincent. 2008. Systematic tendencies in scene viewing. Journal of Eye Movement
Research 2, 2 (2008), 1–18.
B.W. Tatler and B.T. Vincent. 2009. The prominence of behavioural biases in eye guidance. Visual Cognition
17, 6-7 (2009), 1029–1054.
Hamed Rezazadegan Tavakoli, Esa Rahtu, and Janne Heikkila¨. 2013. Stochastic bottom–up fixation predic-
tion and saccade generation. Image and Vision Computing 31, 9 (2013), 686–693.
Hamed R Tavakoli, Victoria Yanulevskaya, Esa Rahtu, Janne Heikkila, and Nicu Sebe. 2014. Emotional
Valence Recognition, Analysis of Salience and Eye Movements. In 2014 22nd International Conference
on Pattern Recognition (ICPR). IEEE, 4666–4671.
A Torralba. 2003. Contextual priming for object detection. Int. J. of Comp. Vis. 53 (2003), 153–167.
A. Torralba, A. Oliva, M.S. Castelhano, and J.M. Henderson. 2006. Contextual guidance of eye movements
and attention in real-world scenes: the role of global features in object search. Psychological review 113,
4 (2006), 766.
R.J. van Beers. 2007. The sources of variability in saccadic eye movements. The Journal of Neuroscience
27, 33 (2007), 8757–8770.
Eleonora Vig, Michael Dorr, and David Cox. 2014. Large-scale optimization of hierarchical features for
saliency prediction in natural images. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition. 2798–2805.
Alessandro Vinciarelli, Maja Pantic, and Herve´ Bourlard. 2009. Social signal processing: Survey of an
emerging domain. Image and Vision Computing 27, 12 (2009), 1743–1759.
Gandhimohan M Viswanathan, Marcos GE Da Luz, Ernesto P Raposo, and H Eugene Stanley. 2011.
The physics of foraging: an introduction to random searches and biological encounters. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Jonathan Vitale, Mary-Anne Williams, Benjamin Johnston, and Giuseppe Boccignone. 2014. Affective facial
expression processing via simulation: A probabilistic model. Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architec-
tures Journal 10 (2014), 30–41.
Kang Wang, Shen Wang, and Qiang Ji. 2016. Deep eye fixation map learning for calibration-free eye gaze
tracking. In Proceedings of the Ninth Biennial ACM Symposium on Eye Tracking Research & Appli-
cations. ACM, 47–55.
Publication date: June 2016.
A probabilistic tour of visual attention A:27
Aleksander Weron and Marcin Magdziarz. 2010. Generalization of the Khinchin theorem to Le´vy flights.
Physical review letters 105, 26 (2010), 260603.
Marco Wischnewski, Anna Belardinelli, Werner Schneider, and Jochen Steil. 2010. Where to Look Next?
Combining Static and Dynamic Proto-objects in a TVA-based Model of Visual Attention. Cognitive
Computation 2, 4 (2010), 326–343.
Ludwig Wittgenstein. 2010. Philosophical investigations. John Wiley & Sons.
Jeremy M Wolfe. 2013. When is it time to move to the next raspberry bush? Foraging rules in human visual
search. Journal of vision 13, 3 (2013), 10.
Junchi Yan, Mengyuan Zhu, Huanxi Liu, and Yuncai Liu. 2010. Visual saliency detection via sparsity
pursuit. Signal Processing Letters, IEEE 17, 8 (2010), 739–742.
Jin-Gang Yu, Ji Zhao, Jinwen Tian, and Yihua Tan. 2014. Maximal entropy random walk for region-based
visual saliency. IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics 44, 9 (2014), 1661–1672.
Gregory J Zelinsky. 2008. A theory of eye movements during target acquisition. Psychological review 115,
4 (2008), 787.
Publication date: June 2016.
